nourishing obscurity

The new Bulava missile doesn’t work because the quality control of so many contributors is uneven plus:

The first in a series of the new Borei-class nuclear submarines has already been launched and has been undergoing sea trials.

Another two such subs, each capable of carrying 12 Bulava missiles, are being built and the construction of the fourth is to start soon.

The new submarines are supposed to replace the aging Soviet-era ones, which are approaching the end of their lifetime. The old submarines carry the Sineva missile, which are too big and too heavy for the new type of submarines.

“It’s a paradoxical situation,” said Alexander Konovalov, the head of the Moscow-based Institute of Strategic Assessment. “We have the Sineva missiles, which are quite good, but the submarines carrying them won’t serve for long. And we have a new good type of submarines supposed to carry the Bulava, but the Bulava isn’t available.”

This is a very Russian situation and shows what happens when Soviet era command and control meets modern-day work practices.  Some technical details and the launch history of the Bulava can be found here.

Part of the problem is in the decline over the past two decades as a result of socio-political change and a lowering of morale, allowing ageing ships and subs to be looted for profit and the control structure bureaucratic and defending its own patch.

“The wish is there on the part of our generals, but where will they get the gadgets?” says Vitaly Shlykov, a former deputy defense minister who now works as a civilian adviser to the Defense Ministry. “The military-industrial complex has been declining for the past 20 years, and nowadays all our best managers are working in oil and gas. The climate may be favorable for pumping in money nowadays, but without fundamental reform it will all remain just talk.”

In a nutshell, the demoralization is deep.  The old conscription service is not working and supplies to front line troops in Ossetia showed shortages and breakdowns which Russian ingenuity ried to get round, e.g. using cellphones when military radios failed.  The legendary intelligence gathering was almost non-existent:

In a desperate effort to get information, the Russians sent an electronic reconnaissance version of the Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber over the battlefield and it got shot down. In all, Russia lost four planes, including three Sukhoi Su-25 attack fighters to unexpectedly effective Georgian air defenses.

Britain’s own history should make it hesitate before looking down its nose at the state of the military  – the muddle-headed dufferism of WW2 still produced victories and if there was a real threat, a real challenge to Russian patriotism, I’ve seen enough of this to know that it was, is and always will be stupid to challenge Russia on its own soil.  Cross that line and it is suddenly a very different war.

Ditto Britain in the Battle of Britain and with Hitler in Normandy.  As long as Russia faces isolated border skirmishes, the Bulava debacles will go on and the infighting will continue.  Face Russia with a genuine threat from a historical enemy and it would be a different matter.

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